About the Campaign
The Palkhed campaign of 1728, is notable for two reasons. First, this campaign has been chosen as brilliant in strategy (”A masterpiece of strategic mobility…“) by Field Marshal Montgomery in his book, A History of Warfare. Whether this was a completely thought-out strategy or circumstances helped formulate this strategy is definitely worth investigating. Secondly, a few historians would claim that the success of this campaign established the Maratha supremacy in the Deccan – and gave way for further adventures; another factor that is worth investigating.
What it did definitely achieve was the handover of the claim of the chauth and sardeshmukhi from Nizam-ul-Mulk to the Shahu
Background
Various factors contributed to the campaign of Palkhed:
- The primary factor was the suspension of the payment of chauth and sardeshmukhi by Nizam-ul-Mulk on the grounds that it was unclear, between Shahu and Shambhaji, who the rightful claimant of the chauth and sardeshmukhi was. Also the timing was important because the Peshwa (Baji Rao) and the Maratha Armies were in Karnataka (the state, south of Maharashtra).
- Existence of hostility between the courts of Satara (Shahu) and Kolhapur (Shambhaji). This hostility was turned to advantage by Nizam-ul-Mulk, who formed an alliance with Shambhaji, against the Shahu (and Baji Rao)
- Differences between the Peshwa (Baji Rao) and the Pratinidhi (Shripat Rao). The latter preferred to have good relations with Nizam-ul-Mulk, whereas Baji Rao pursued and advocated an expansionist policy.
Event
Baji Rao and the Maratha armies were called back from the south, from the Karnataka campaign. In May 1727, Baji Rao then asked Shahu to break of negotiations with the Nizam-ul-Mulk (Nizam-ul-Mulk had called for an arbitration over the payment of the chauth and sardeshmukhi) and started mobilizing an army. With the monsoons over and the land ready for this exciting campaign, Baji Rao moved towards Aurangabad.
After a skirmish near Jalna (the Marathas by now had become famous for their strategy of not engaging with the enemy) with Iwaz Khan (the General of Nizam-ul-Mulk), as could have been predicted, Baji Rao moved away from the battlefield, towards Burhanpur (north of Maharashtra, see map below).
Nizam-ul-Mulk’s army pursued Baji Rao. Baji Rao then moved westwards to Gujarat from North Khandesh. However the Nizam-ul-Mulk gave up the pursuit and moved southward towards Pune. This is an interesting reason and comparison between how the two armies functioned. The Nizam is known to have carried huge armies with him, including supplies to last for the duration of the campaign. In fact, the Nizam used to carry his jenana or womenfolk with him during his campaigns. The Maratha armies however were very light and found supplies on the way way by plundering and looting out-posts on the way.
As Nizam-ul-Mulk left the pursuit of Baji Rao and moved towards the headquarters of the Shahu stronghold, posts like Udapur, Avasari, Pabal, Khed, and Narayangarh surrendered to Nizam-ul-Mulk, who then occupied Pune and advanced towards Supa, Patas, and Baramati.
In Baramati, Nizam-ul-Mulk got news of Baji Rao moving towards Aurangabad. Nizam-ul-Mulk began moving northwards to intercept the Maratha Army. By this time he was confident of crushing Baji Rao and his army. It was not to happen so. The Raja of Kolhapur, Shambhaji (not to be confused with Sambhaji, son of Shivaji) refused to join him in this campaign against Baji Rao. Nizam-ul-Mulk was cornered in a waterless tract near Palkhed of 25 February 1728. Nizam-ul-Mulk’s army refused to fight. Through Iwaz Khan, the Nizam-ul-Mulk sent out word of his plight, and his army was allowed to move to the vicinity of the river.
Result
A peace treaty was signed on 6 March 1728 at Mungi-Paithan.
Map
Orange Arrows: Route, possibly taken by the Peshwa
Green Arrows: Route, possibly taken by the Nizam-ul-Mulk
[...] If you are looking for this page, it has moved here. [...]
Just stumbled upon this article. FOund it excellent; very informative. War history especially of the Marathas is a subject of great passion for me.
Vinay
==Vinay:
Thank you so much - this blog isn’t regularly updated, but keep coming
The hostory published here is greatly important for Maratha ,which are lagging behind for gaining information .T
I didn’t exactly get it.
How did Bajirao anticipate the propable advance of Nizam ul Mulk’s army?
If it wasn’t consequential, he must be a genius.
==Sushant:
Did your comment come in incomplete?
==Varun:
Not sure which ‘anticipation’ you talk of.
I want to know more about the Baji Rao and his Phalked campaign. It is interesting.
==TN Mahesh:
Thank you for stopping by
Will do, as son as I get my research around!
It seems that Bajirao’s strategy was circumstantial rather than intentional. Otherwise how could he allow Nizam to capture Pune, the seat of Peshwas, by moving toward Gujarat at the time when Nizam was poised to attack?
==Ravi Sathe:
I agree with you - it does appear to be circumstantial - to an extent. I say, to an extent - only because there was a possibility that he would have done the obvious, in the event (surrender, face the enemy direct or such)
I believe strategy doesn’t always necessarily require that the “seat” is guarded; what is important (in a personal opinion) i sto keep the window of opportunity open to regain it.
Thank you for your comment. Much appreciated.
Isn’t all the battles fought through the ages a matter of circumstance? Had the Nizam not resorted to sabre rattling and continued with the chauth payment, the events would not have built up to his defeat.
I feel that the Bajirao knew that the best way to defend Pune was to take the battle to the Nizam. An attacker always has the initiative. Clubbed with surprise and timing he holds the key to making holes in the defender’s plan. Of course, the Nizam did not expect such a bold action and was not having any defensive posture.
The Marathas always used their asymmetry of tactics and force levels to their advantage. The Chatrapati too knew that his army was not trained nor could fight classical battles/wars. The first and the last was at Panipat and we all know how that defeat changed the course of India’s history. To borrow from a friend’s point of view, “Another point was that Marathas as raiders did not ‘make a stand’ anywhere .. even Pune was never defended to the death at any point, but was abandoned whenever threatened.”
The last point which Atul makes above too is very pertinent. Look at the US strategy since WW II. It fights all its battles/wars away from home. Of course, the technology and equipment is not comparable, but the strategy is.
found it useful in my on going project- A geopolitical Atlas of Maratha Empire which is a map history of th Maratha People.
Thanks a ton for th concise account.
J. Diddee